(This is part two of a three part series. Click here to read part one.)
By early September 1994, David Wilson, Mark Slater, and Jean-Michel Braquet had been held hostage in the jungles near Kep for over a month. The situation was growing more complicated as the Khmer Rouge leadership intervened, ransom demands increased, reporters inserted themselves, and potential deals for the captives’ release fell through amid intensifying shelling.
With no reliable information coming from the hostages, rumors and speculation ran rampant. A story about their imminent release would be followed by another suggesting they had already been killed. Ms. Stephanie Shwabsky, an Australian diplomat and head of the Cambodia Task Force, later remarked, “Cambodia is a society in which you never get one story, ever, no matter how simple the instance seems.”
Despite objections from the Western governments, the Cambodian Army stepped up their assault against Khmer Rouge positions in Phnom Voar. On September 22nd, a large offensive was launched, capturing more of their territory. The Khmer Rouge, on their clandestine radio, reported that in over five days of fighting, they had fended off a six-pronged attack, and “ambushed the invasion forces from six directions by detonating mines, bamboo spikes and mobile attacks”.
By the end of September, the army was within three kilometers of their base, had encircled their positions and was pushing forward. The rebels were running low on food and supplies and it was believed they had been forced to relocate the prisoners several times. Although there had been photos, messages, and even video of the captives during the early weeks of the crisis, by the start of October, more than a month had passed without any updates on their condition.
Reports of casualties from the escalating conflict varied wildly depending on the source. One medic estimated that at least one or two people were being killed per day on both sides.
Yet, the Khmer Rouge held on to their position.
For over fifteen years, successive authorities, including the Vietnamese and United Nations, had attempted to resolve the Khmer Rouge crisis in Cambodia, both politically and militarily. Nothing had managed to dislodge them. A few months prior to the kidnapping, the newly elected Cambodian government had tried a different strategy: offering amnesty.
For centuries, Cambodia has endured successive foreign ideologies imposed upon it. Various groups, including the Vietnamese, the French, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations, sought to shape the nation according to their version of an ideal society, often disregarding the country’s own history and culture. In every instance, this only brought more suffering to the Cambodians.
Cambodia, now fully independent, returned to what it knew.
Since before the Khmer Empire, Cambodia has been a hierarchical, patronage society where a person’s self-worth is measured by the power and influence they have, as well as their ability to provide for those under them. While the government had adopted a Western political system, their social organization was rooted in traditional society, emerging from the dynamics of Cambodian families and villages rather than being imposed upon them.
The new government aimed to end the conflict using a traditionally inspired approach: by offering both amnesty from prosecution and by providing them a position in the new political structure, the rebels would be able to defect and abandon their ideology, all while allowing them to save face and maintain their sense of self-worth. It was a desperate attempt to end the conflict without the need for further bloodshed.
In defense of this strategy, Prime Minister Hun Sen later stated, “For the sake of the nation, we had to do it. To destroy 70% of the Khmer Rouge forces, we needed to pay a price too — that was the amnesty provided to [The Khmer Rouge].” It would work. In just over five years, the Khmer Rouge would disintegrate and be absorbed into society, finally bringing almost thirty years of conflict to an end and peace to a battered country.
It was because of that offer of amnesty that, on October 16, Chhouk Rin, the commander of the regiment that attacked the train, walked out of the jungle with over 150 of his men and surrendered. The defection was a massive blow to the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Voar. Days later, Rin was seen “relishing on fine food and enjoying the nightlife of Kampot,” a free man.
Despite the defection, the state of the hostages was still unknown. Chhouk Rin could only confirm that Pol Pot himself had ordered them to be kept alive. However, reports of their deaths became more frequent. On October 18th, a Cambodian hostage who had been released provided the first strongly credible death report: the hostages had been taken out and shot somewhere around the beginning of September.
By the end of October, the Cambodian army had overrun the enemy position and was searching their strongholds for the hostages. A Khmer Rouge soldier who had defected claimed he had not seen the hostages in over a month, “[not] since the government forces began their assault” Although there were rumors that the hostages had been moved to Palin, it seemed unlikely.
On October 27th, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evens, announced he had received credible evidence that the men had been killed, adding, “We are making it clear today that if the worst is true and David Wilson and his two friends have, in fact, been killed by the Khmer Rouge then we and the other countries concerned simply cannot and will not accept anything other than the murderers being brought to justice.”
On November 2nd, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that the graves of the backpackers had been discovered. All three had been executed.
As the Cambodian army completed taking control the area, it became clear that the individuals responsible for the train attack and the hostages’ deaths had managed to escape justice.
Apart from Chhouk Rin, who had defected and received amnesty, Nuon Peat—the political commander of Phnom Voar and Chhouk Rin’s direct superior, the man who had held the captives and led the negotiations—had vanished into the jungle. Vith Vorn, the chief commander of military forces in Phnom Voar, would eventually also defect, however he was assassinated shortly after. Most alarmingly, Sam Bith, the commander of the entire Southwest Region – the most senior Khmer Rouge official who was directly responsible for the area – escaped. He would later defect in 1996, however, as part of his amnesty, he was made a two-star general in the RCAF, making him essentially untouchable.
The deals of amnesty outraged the families who wanted closure for their sons’ murders. The people responsible weren’t just free men; they were being rewarded.
It would take almost eight years before they would get their chance at justice. However, that justice would first have to be played out in Cambodia’s court system.